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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
The issue on appeal is whether the Fair Labor Standards 
Act applies to a non-profit corporation pr oviding residential 
human services programs for mentally ill and mentally 
retarded adults. The District Court held the FLSA applied, 
and granted plaintiffs summary judgment, r elying in part 
on an interpretive guideline of the Department of Labor. We 
agree the FLSA applies. But in view of the Supr eme Court's 
recent clarification of the amount of defer ence to be 
accorded administrative agencies' infor mal statutory 
interpretations, we will vacate the judgment and remand for 
further findings. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 
576, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 1662 (2000). 
 
I. Background 
 
Plaintiffs are current and for mer employees of Defendant 
Resources for Human Development, Inc. (RHD). RHD is a 
Pennsylvania non-profit corporation that pr ovides its 
clients--mentally ill and mentally retar ded adults--with 
human services programs such as community health 
 
                                2 
  
centers, transportation services, and community living 
facilities and assistance. RHD employs approximately 2,400 
persons. Plaintiffs, residential advisers in RHD's "Mandela" 
and "Visions" programs, claimed RHD violated the FLSA by 
underpaying them. Specifically, they claim RHD improperly 
calculated their regular and overtime pay rates by failing to 
include in the calculation the value of the RHD employee 
benefits plan, which has a cash option. RHD denied 
coverage on the ground that its residential advisors in the 
Mandela and Visions programs fell within FLSA's 
"companionship exemption." 
 
A. The RHD Fairshare Employee Benefit Plan 
 
RHD provides its employees with a benefit plan--the 
"Fairshare Plan"--that allows employees to select benefits 
from a "menu" of choices including health insurance, 
medical reimbursement accounts, life insurance, long-term 
disability insurance, and cash.1 Each month, RHD 
contributes to each of its employees' Fairshar e accounts an 
amount comprising $100.00 plus seven percent of the 
employee's base monthly salary. Employees also may 
supplement their accounts to buy additional benefits. 
Employees who want to receive some or all benefits in cash 
must sign a written waiver of health insurance coverage. 
RHD then includes the cash amount in the employee's 
regular paycheck. 
 
When calculating an employee's regular pay rate, RHD 
does not include its contributions to the employee's 
Fairshare account. RHD uses an employee's r egular pay 
rate to calculate any overtime pay; overtime pay is equal to 
1.5 times an employee's regular pay rate. 
 
B. RHD's Mandela and Visions Programs 
 
RHD's Mandela and Visions programs pr ovide assistance, 
support, and training to mentally ill and mentally r etarded 
adults. Both programs are "community living 
arrangements" that help clients make the transition from 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Because employees can select differ ent benefits from a "menu," the 
plan is referred to as a "cafeteria" plan. The cash option is consistent 
with the Internal Revenue Code's provisions regarding cafeteria plans. 
See 26 U.S.C. S 125(d)(1)(B). 
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institutional to independent living. Each client is supported 
by a team assembled by the county, which includes a 
county case manager, mental health pr ofessionals, family 
members, and an RHD staff member. The county managers 
and other county officials monitor RHD's services to ensure 
they comply with a service plan. The service plan content is 
set by state and federal regulations. The plan itself is 
funded with the state and federal money that funded the 
client's prior institutionalization. 
 
With the help of RHD residential advisors, clients in the 
Mandela and Visions programs select r esidences from a list 
of RHD-approved options. RHD rents the pr operty and 
subleases it to its clients.2 Although utility service is 
arranged in clients' names, payment is made thr ough RHD. 
RHD prepares lists of potential roommates from which 
clients may choose.3 If they wish, clients can change 
locations or residential advisors. Clients also may 
discontinue RHD's services, but then they must vacate the 
RHD-leased property. 
 
Clients pay up to 72 percent of their monthly Social 
Security Disability payments to cover rent and other 
ordinary living expenses. RHD maintains a custodial 
account for clients' Social Security benefits; RHD is the 
payee of some benefit checks. For some clients who receive 
spending money, RHD holds and distributes the money. 
 
Mandela clients' subleases with RHD include "house 
rules." House rules state: (1) no drugs, alcohol, or loud 
music; (2) residents be dressed if outside their bedrooms 
between 8:30 a.m. and 10:00 p.m.; and (3) residents keep 
the staff informed of their wher eabouts at all times. Visions 
clients' subleases have no house rules. 
 
Clients in both programs must maintain and keep up 
their residences; they also may choose their home 
furnishings. They must choose, purchase, and prepare food 
for their own meals. They must maintain personal hygiene, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In a few cases, RHD owns the property and rents it directly to 
program participants. 
 
3. On occasion, the county refers clients to RHD to live with another 
person in the program. 
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and select and wash their own clothes. But if a client is 
physically or mentally unable to cook, clean, or maintain 
the residence, RHD employees will do so. 
 
RHD retains keys to clients' residences. On-duty RHD 
employees may use the keys to enter clients' r esidents, but 
must knock before entering. Clients deemed capable keep 
their own keys. In the Mandela program, only six of eleven 
clients have keys to their own residences; only three are 
allowed to leave their residences unattended. 
 
II. Proceedings 
 
Dannett Madison, an RHD resident advisor , filed this 
class action in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania on December 5, 1997. 
Madison claimed RHD improperly calculated overtime pay 
by excluding from the regular pay rate calculation: (1) 
Fairshare benefits payments; (2) bonuses; and (3) the 15- 
minute periods by which plaintiffs came to work early each 
day. Twenty-two additional plaintiffs opted into the class 
action; fourteen before the District Court issued its 
summary judgment decision and eight after, in accord with 
the FLSA's opt-in provisions.4 See 29 U.S.C. S 216(b). 
 
RHD moved for summary judgment on three gr ounds. 
First, RHD claimed the FLSA wage and hours rules did not 
apply to plaintiffs because they fell within the 
"companionship exemption." That provision excludes from 
FLSA coverage "domestic service" employees who provide 
companionship services to "individuals who (because of age 
or infirmity) are unable to car e for themselves." 29 U.S.C. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Four members of the class, including Madison, also filed a class action 
suit in Pennsylvania state court alleging RHD failed to include 
contributions to its employee benefit plan in its calculation of overtime 
pay rates; RHD failed to include yearly bonuses in its calculation of 
overtime pay rates; and RHD failed to pay all wages and bonuses when 
due. 
 
One plaintiff, Carl Scott, filed suit in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania alleging retaliation by RHD for having opted in to this class 
action. A bench trial in that case resulted in judgment for RHD which is 
currently being appealed. 
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S 213(a)(15). Second, RHD contended its benefit plan was a 
bona fide health and welfare benefits plan, and thus its 
payments properly were excluded fr om the regular pay rate 
calculation. See 29 U.S.C. S 207(e)(4).5 Third, RHD argued 
bonuses need not be included in the calculation of the 
regular rate of pay. See 29 U.S.C.S 207(e)(3). Plaintiffs 
opposed the motion, but did not file their own cr oss-motion 
for summary judgment. 
 
On January 8, 1999, the District Court granted in part 
and denied in part RHD's motion for summary judgment. 
The court found there were no material factual disputes on 
the application of the FLSA and of S 213(a)(15) and 
S 207(e)(4). See Madison v. Resour ces for Human 
Development, Inc., Civ. No. 97-7402, slip op. at 4 n.4 (E.D. 
Pa. Jan. 8, 1999). The court also held as a matter of law 
RHD could not claim the companionship exemption and the 
bona fide plan exclusion. See id. at 18. The parties settled 
the 15 minutes issue and stipulated to the amount of 
damages and prospective relief on the benefits issue.6 
 
In June 1999, on RHD's motion, the District Court closed 
the class, and in September 1999 entered judgment in 
favor of 17 plaintiffs. RHD appealed. 
 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our review 
of summary judgment is plenary. We view all evidence and 
draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the non- 
movant, affirming if no reasonable jury could find for the 
non-movant. See Whiteland Woods, L.P . v. Township of West 
Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 180 (3d Cir . 1999). Our review of 
the district court's interpretation of the FLSA is plenary. 
See, e.g., Stephens v. Kerrigan, 122 F .3d 171, 176 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. "[T]he "regular rate" at which an employee is employed shall be 
deemed to include all remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf 
of, the employee, but shall not be deemed to include. . . (4) 
contributions irrevocably made by an employer to a trustee or third 
person pursuant to a bona fide plan for pr oviding old-age, retirement, 
life, accident, or health insurance, or similar benefits for employees 
. . . ." 29 U.S.C. S 207(e)(4). 
 
6. The District Court granted RHD summary judgment with respect to 
the bonus issue. See Madison, Civ. No. 97-7402, slip op. at 18. 
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III. Discussion  
 
A. The District Court Complied With 
       Fed. R. Civ. P. 56  
 
A threshold issue is whether the District Court complied 
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 in deciding RHD's 
summary judgment motion. The District Court concluded 
plaintiffs "are not employees exempted from FLSA coverage 
by the companion exemption, so RHD's overtime payment 
must comply with FLSA's rules." Madison, Civ. No. 97- 
7402, slip op. at 18. RHD asserts the decision constituted 
a sua sponte summary judgment in Madison's favor , 
without the notice required by Rule 56. 7 RHD is correct 
that "a district court may not grant summary judgment sua 
sponte unless the court gives notice and an opportunity to 
oppose summary judgment." Otis Elevator Co. v. George 
Washington Hotel Corp., 27 F.3d 903, 910 (3d Cir. 1994). 
But that did not happen here. 
 
Faced with RHD's motion for summary judgment, the 
District Court decided whether RHD was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law under 29 U.S.C. S 213(a)(15). 
In addressing the motion, the court found no dispute of 
material fact with respect to whether FLSA and its 
companionship exemption applied (a conclusion neither 
party contests), and concluded as a matter of law RHD was 
not entitled to judgment under that provision. In rejecting 
RHD's asserted affirmative defense, the District Court held 
RHD could not, as a matter of law, meet its bur den of 
proof. See Madison, Civ. No. 97-7402, slip op. at 4. 
 
Holding RHD could not prevail as a matter of law, on 
what RHD apparently considered one of its strongest 
affirmative defenses, does not mean the court improperly 
granted summary judgment to plaintiffs. The District 
Court's judgment left intact RHD's other affir mative 
defenses (statute of limitations, laches, waiver , estoppel, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Defendant argues the same with r espect to the District Court's 
conclusion that RHD's Fairshare Plan was not exempted from the regular 
pay rate calculation under 29 U.S.C. S 207(e)(4). Given our disposition of 
that issue, we need not address RHD's summary judgment argument 
with respect to S 207(e)(4). See  discussion infra. 
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good faith) that RHD was free to pursue. Indeed, the court 
did not enter judgment for plaintiffs until nine months after 
denying in part RHD's summary judgment motion. RHD 
appealed only after the parties stipulated to damages and 
prospective relief, and settled other claims. We see no 
violation of Rule 56. 
 
B. The FLSA Companionship Exemption  
 
       1. Interpreting "domestic service employment" 
 
The District Court held the FLSA companionship 
exemption did not apply to RHD's Mandela and V isions 
employees. That provision excludes from FLSA minimum 
wage and maximum hours rules: 
 
       [A]ny employee employed in domestic service 
       employment to provide companionship services for 
       individuals who (because of age or infirmity) are unable 
       to care for themselves (as such terms ar e defined and 
       delineated by regulations of the Secretary) . . . . 
 
29 U.S.C. S 213(a)(15). The statute does not define 
"domestic service employment." To construe the exemption, 
the District Court relied on 29 C.F.R.S 552.3, which defines 
"domestic service" as 
 
       services of a household nature perfor med by an 
       employee in or about a private home (permanent or 
       temporary) of the person by whom he or she is 
       employed. The term includes employees such as cooks, 
       waiters, butlers, valets, maids, housekeepers, 
       governesses, nurses, janitors, laundresses, caretakers, 
       handymen, gardeners, footmen, grooms, and 
       chauffeurs . . . . This listing is illustrative and not 
       exhaustive. 
 
The District Court understood this regulation to mean the 
exemption applied only to employees who "per form 
household services in a private home." See Madison, Civ. 
No. 97-7402, slip op. at 3. The District Court then 
concluded RHD could not establish that its clients' homes 
were "`private' within the meaning of the statute." Id. at 4. 
 
We agree with the District Court's r eliance on 29 C.F.R. 
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S 552.3 to determine the meaning of"domestic service." We 
also agree that in order for services to constitute a 
"domestic service" under Section 552.3, they must be 
provided in "private homes."8  But there is scant regulation, 
legislative history, or case law to guide deter mination of 
whether the living arrangements here constitute"private 
homes." 
 
       2. Regulatory, legislative, and case law 
       interpretations of "private home" 
 
The pertinent regulation discussing "private home" as 
used in 29 C.F.R. S 552.3 is not dispositive. It provides: 
 
       (a) The definition of "domestic service employment" 
       contained in S 552.3 is derived from the regulations 
       issued under the Social Security Act (20 CFR 404.1057) 
       and from "the generally accepted meaning" of the term. 
       Accordingly, the term includes persons who are 
       frequently referred to as "private household workers." 
       See S. Rep. 93-690, p. 20. The domestic service must 
       be performed in or about the private home of the 
       employer whether that home is a fixed place of abode or 
       a temporary dwelling as in the case of an individual or 
       family traveling on vacation. A separate and distinct 
       dwelling maintained by an individual or a family in an 
       apartment house, condominium or hotel may constitute 
       a private home. 
 
       (b) Employees employed in dwelling places which ar e 
       primarily rooming or boarding houses ar e not 
       considered domestic service employees. The places 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Neither party disputes the role 29 C.F .R. SS 552.3 and 552.101 should 
play in our construction of 29 U.S.C. S 213(a)(15). If, as is the 
situation 
here, the underlying statute is ambiguous, we afford deference to formal 
agency regulations resulting from notice and comment rule making 
construing the statutory provision unless those regulations constitute an 
impermissible interpretation of the statute. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). There is no 
dispute the regulations construing 29 C.F .R. S 213(a)(15) are formal 
regulations. We find the pertinent r egulations to be reasonable and thus 
are guided by their definitions in our construction of the "companionship 
exemption." 
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       where they work are not private homes but commercial 
       or business establishments. Likewise, employees 
       employed in connection with a business or pr ofessional 
       service which is conducted in a home (such as a r eal 
       estate, doctor's, dentist's or lawyer's office) ar e not 
       domestic service employees. . . . 
 
29 C.F.R. S 552.101. Although the r egulation provides some 
guidance as to what constitutes a "private home," it does 
not settle the question. 
 
The legislative history is similarly unhelpful. In 
discussing changes to the FLSA intended to cover domestic 
service employees--which in turn created the need for the 
companionship exemption at issue here--the House Report 
accompanying the 1974 Amendment to the FLSA noted: 
 
       The domestic service must be performed in a private 
       home which is a fixed place of abode of the individual 
       or family. A separate and distinct dwelling maintained 
       by the individual or family in an apartment house or 
       hotel may constitute a private home. However , a 
       dwelling house used primarily as a boarding or lodging 
       house for the purposes of supplying such services to 
       the public, as a business enterprise, is not a private 
       home. 
 
House Rep. No. 93-913 reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2811, 2845. This discussion of "private home" does not 
provide a definitive answer either. 
 
The case law is divergent. In Terwilliger v. Home of Hope, 
Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (N.D. Okla. 1998), the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma 
faced a similar factual scenario. See id. at 1297-1298. 
Holding the homes in question were private, the court in 
Terwilliger noted the defendant did not acquire either the 
residence or the furniture for the client; 22% of the homes 
were owned by the client or the client's par ent or guardian, 
with the remainder rented or leased fr om third parties in 
the client's name; the defendant did not co-sign the lease 
and had no property interest in the client's residence; the 
defendant had keys to the residences only for emergency or 
consensual use; and the defendant paid rent fr om the 
client's trust account. Id. at 1300. The Terwilliger court 
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distinguished its holding from that in Linn v. Dev. Svcs., 
891 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Okla. 1995). Linn  held homes were 
not "private homes" because the defendant acquired the 
homes and furniture; maintained keys to the homes; 
decided how many and which clients lived in the homes; 
frequently signed leases for the clients; and r eceived state 
money on the clients' behalf, which it then used to pay rent 
on the clients' behalf. Linn, 891 F. Supp. at 579. Terwilliger 
differed because the defendant ther e did not acquire the 
residences in question, maintained keys to the homes only 
for emergency and consensual use, and did not decide 
where and with whom clients would live. See id. at 1300. 
Thus, the homes in Terwilliger wer e held to be private. See 
id. at 1300. 
 
The Utah Supreme Court also has consider ed when 
domestic services are provided in a "private home" and 
therefore covered by the FLSA companionship exemption. 
That court applied four factors to reach its decision: (1) the 
facility's source of funding; (2) the public's degree of access 
to the facility; (3) the facility's status as a for -profit or not- 
for-profit organization; and (4) the size of the organization. 
See Bowler v. Deseret Village Ass'n, Inc., 922 P.2d 8, 13-14 
(Utah 1996). Applying its test, the Court found the 
defendant, a "privately funded, nonprofit Utah corporation 
which provides a residential and vocational `development 
habitation' for fourteen marginally mentally and physically 
handicapped adults," was "more like a`private home' than 
an `institution' or a business enterprise." Id. at 11, 14. 
 
We conclude that none of these cases, nor the relevant 
administrative and legislative material, provides clear 
guidance in this matter. What is clear is that the 
determination of what constitutes a "private home" in the 
context of the FLSA companionship exemption must be 
made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all 
aspects of the living arrangements. 
 
       3. The Mandela and Visions programs residences 
       are not "private" 
 
We construe FLSA exemptions narrowly against the 
employer. See Mitchell v. Kentucky Fin. Co., 359 U.S. 290, 
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295 (1959); Reich v. Gateway Press, Inc. , 13 F.3d 685, 694 
(3d Cir. 1994). The District Court concluded, as a matter of 
law, that RHD had not overcome its significant burden in 
establishing its affirmative defense. W e agree. 
 
Several aspects of the Mandela and Visions living 
arrangements support the District Court's conclusion that 
the companionship exemption does not apply. For example, 
RHD clients do not have a possessory interest in their RHD 
homes. The right of RHD clients to remain in their housing 
depends completely on their continued relationship with 
RHD. If clients terminate that relationship, they cannot 
remain in RHD housing. This is not the kind of possessory 
interest individuals enjoy in a private home. 
 
RHD clients do not have full control over others' access 
to their RHD homes. RHD retains keys to the homes of all 
clients in the Mandela and Visions pr ogram. Indeed, RHD 
keeps the only set of keys with respect to nearly half the 
clients in the Mandela program. Less than half of the 
clients in that program (five of eleven) have keys to their 
houses. 
 
RHD clients do not have unfettered freedom in their day- 
to-day conduct. They must comply with rules that do not 
typically apply to adults in private homes. One such rule 
requires RHD clients to be dressed when outside their 
rooms between the hours of 8:30 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. This 
rule is incongruous with the notion of a "private home."9 
 
Given the contours of the living arrangements at issue 
here, and the rule that FLSA exemptions should be 
narrowly construed against the employer , we conclude as a 
matter of law the RHD residences are not"private homes" 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. As noted by the District Court, Terwilliger differs from this case in 
important respects. See Madison, Civ. No. 97-7402, slip op. at 8. In 
Terwilliger, the court placed a significant emphasis on the nature of the 
possessory interest clients had in the pr operty in question. The clients 
there had either an ownership or direct lessee interest in the property. 
See Terwilliger, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1299-1300. In contrast, RHD's clients 
have significant restrictions placed on their interest and rights 
concerning the property. They sublease the property from RHD, and 
their right to remain on the property is tied directly to their continued 
involvement in the RHD-administered program. 
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for purposes of S 213(a)(15). We will affirm the District 
Court's holding that the FLSA applies to the plaintiffs' 
employment relationship with RHD. 
 
We now turn to the question whether RHD's 
contributions to the Fairshare accounts should be included 
in plaintiffs' regular and overtime pay rates. 
 
C. Applying FLSA to RHD's Fairshare Account 
       Contributions 
 
FLSA requires overtime pay to be at least 1-1/2 times the 
"regular rate" of pay. See 29 U.S.C. S 207. Section 207(e)(4) 
provides the "regular rate" includes all remuneration paid 
to, or on behalf of, the employee, but does not include: 
 
       (4) contributions irrevocably made by an employer to a 
       trustee or third person pursuant to a bonafide plan for 
       providing old-age, retirement, life, accident, or health 
       insurance, or similar benefits for employees . . .. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 207(e)(4). 
 
The District Court concluded RHD's contributions to the 
Fairshare accounts were not excludable under S 207(e)(4). 
The court based its analysis on 29 C.F.R.S 778.215(a)(5), 
which provides: 
 
       (a) General Rules. In order for an employer's 
       contributions to qualify for exclusion from the regular 
       rate under section 7(e)(4) of the Act, the following 
       conditions must be met: 
 
       . . . 
 
       (5) The plan must not give an employee the right to 
       assign his benefits under the plan nor the option to 
       receive any part of the employer's contributions in 
       cash instead of the benefits under the plan: Provided, 
       however, That if a plan otherwise qualified as a bona 
       fide benefit plan under section 7(e)(4) of the Act, it 
       will still be regarded as a bona fide plan even though 
       it provides, as an incidental part ther eof, for the 
       payment to an employee in cash of all or a part of 
       the amount standing to his credit (i) at the time of 
       the severance of the employment relation due to 
       causes other than retirement, disability, or death, or 
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       (ii) upon proper termination of the plan, or (iii) 
       during the course of his employment under 
 655<!>circumstances specified in the plan and not 
 
       inconsistent with the general purposes of the plan to 
       provide the benefits described in section 7(e)(4) of the 
       Act. 
 
RHD claims the District Court erred in r elying on this 
regulatory provision because the gover ning statutory 
authority, 29 U.S.C. S 207(e)(4), is not ambiguous. It also 
argues that because the Administrator who issued 29 
C.F.R. S 778.215(a)(5) did not have delegated authority to 
interpret S 207(e)(4), "the Administrator's interpretation may 
be considered only if it is a well-reasoned, persuasive 
interpretation of S 207(e)(4) consistent with congressional 
intent." Even if 29 C.F.R. S 778.215(a)(5) governs, RHD 
insists its Fairshare Plan conforms with the Administrator's 
dictates. 
 
We agree S 207(e)(4) is ambiguous in this context. But we 
will vacate the District Court's denial of summary judgment 
for failure properly to analyze 29 C.F .R. S 778.215(a)(5). The 
District Court treated S 778.215(a)(5) as a formal agency 
regulation, when it is not.10 Section 778.215(a)(5) is merely 
an interpretative guideline of the agency. 
 
       1. FLSA S 207(e)(4) is ambiguous 
 
It is well-settled that if a statute unambiguously 
expresses Congress's intent, courts must give effect to that 
intent. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
529 U.S. 120, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 1297 (2000) (citing Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)). RHD argues S 207(e)(4) is clear 
and unambiguous, because although the statute does not 
define "bona fide," that term has an ordinary usage. Relying 
on Black's Law Dictionary and Random House Webster's 
Unabridged Dictionary, RHD contends "bonafide" means 
"good faith." It argues there is nothing to suggest its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Because we will remand for the District Court to examine the 
administrative provision under the proper deference standard, we need 
not reach RHD's final argument that the Fairshare Plan conforms with 
the dictates of S 778.215(a)(5). 
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Fairshare Plan is anything but a good faith attempt to 
provide its employees with benefits. 
 
Assuming arguendo that "bona fide" does not render 
S 207(e)(4) ambiguous, we cannot say the same of the 
remainder of the provision. As noted, the section allows 
exclusion of contributions to plans that provide "old-age, 
retirement, life, accident, or health insurance, or similar 
benefits for employees." 29 U.S.C. S 207(e)(4). The "or 
similar benefits" language is imprecise by its own terms 
and capable of ambiguity. Therefore, we hold the plain 
language of S 207(e)(4) does not provide sufficient guidance 
to govern the application of the statute in this case. 
 
       2. The weight of authority of 29 C.F.R. 
       S 778.215(a)(5) 
 
In light of the statutory ambiguity, we must examine 29 
C.F.R. S 778.215(a)(5) for guidance, and determine what 
deference, if any, it is owed in our construction of the 
statute. See Cleary v. Waldman, 167 F .3d 801, 808 (3d Cir. 
1999) cert. denied. 120 S.Ct. 170. That deter mination is 
crucial because formal agency regulations receive more 
deference than mere interpretive guidelines. See 
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 120 S.Ct. 
1655, 1662 (2000) ("Interpretations such as those in 
opinion letters--like interpretations contained in policy 
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, 
all of which lack the force of law--do not warrant Chevron- 
style deference."). 
 
       a. 29 C.F.R. S 778.215(a)(5) is an interpretive 
       guideline. 
 
The District Court appears to have interpreted 29 C.F.R. 
S 778.215(a)(5) as a formal agency regulation.11 See, e.g., 
Madison, Civ. No. 97-7402, slip op. at 11 (r eferring to 29 
C.F.R. S 778.215(a)(5) as a "Department of Labor 
regulation[ ]"). But Section 778.215(a)(5) is not a formal 
administrative regulation. This is made clear by 28 C.F.R. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The District Court did not explicitly addr ess the level of deference 
that it applied to S 778.215(a)(5). 
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S 778.1, which lays out the purpose of Part 778 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations. Section 778.1 provides: 
 
       This Part 778 constitutes the official interpr etation of 
       the Department of Labor with respect to the meaning 
       and application of the maximum hours and overtime 
       pay requirements contained in section 7 of the Act. It 
       is the purpose of this bulletin to make available in one 
       place the interpretation so these provisions which will 
       guide the Secretary of Labor and the Administrator in 
       the performance of their duties under the Act unless 
       they are otherwise directed by authoritative decisions 
       of the court or conclude, upon reexamination of an 
       interpretation, that it is incorrect. These official 
       interpretations are issued by the Administrator on the 
       advice of the Solicitor of Labor, as authorized by the 
       Secretary. 
 
29 C.F.R. S 778.1. Section 778.1 leaves no doubt that 
S 778.215(a)(5) is an interpretive guideline, issued on the 
advice of the Solicitor of Labor and authorized by the 
Secretary, not an official regulation pr omulgated after 
notice-and-comment rule making. 
 
       b. Under Christensen v. Harris County, informal 
       agency interpretations are not binding, but are 
       entitled to respect to the extent they ar e 
       persuasive. 
 
We have made clear that agency interpr etive guidelines 
"do not rise to the level of a regulation and do not have the 
effect of law." Brooks v. V illage of Ridgefield Park, 185 F.3d 
130, 135 (3d Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court recently 
clarified the distinction between the level of deference to be 
accorded formal agency regulations and informal agency 
interpretations. In Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 
576, 120 S.Ct. 1655 (2000), the Court explained that 
informal agency interpretations in "opinion letters and 
similar documents" are not entitled to Chevron deference.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. As noted, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837 (1984), held courts must defer to an agency's regulation 
interpreting an ambiguous statute, if the statute is one the agency is 
charged to administer. 
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Instead, they are "entitled to respect" under Skidmore v. 
Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944), but only to the extent they have 
the "power to persuade."13  Christensen, 529 U.S. 576, 120 
S.Ct. at 1663. To grant Chevron deference to informal 
agency interpretations would unduly validate the results of 
an informal process. 
 
The Supreme Court's clarification in Christensen requires 
us to revisit our previously applied parameters of deference. 
See, e.g., United States v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 200 
F.3d 143, 151-52 (3d Cir. 1999) (following Cleary; court 
must defer to agency's statutory interpretation that find 
support in informal agency practice); Br ooks v. Ridgefield 
Park, 185 F.3d at 135 (agency's interpr etive bulletins do not 
have the effect of law; level of defer ence due is governed by 
bulletin's persuasiveness); Cleary, 167 F .3d at 808 
(agency's informal interpretation is accorded deference if 
agency is charged to interpret the statute, if the 
interpretation is consistent with agency's other 
pronouncements, and if the interpretation furthers the 
statute's purposes). Christensen now confirms that informal 
agency interpretations are entitled to r espect based only on 
their persuasiveness. So that the District Court may apply 
this standard, we will remand this case for a determination 
of the "power to persuade" of S 778.215(a)(5) and the extent 
to which it is "entitled to respect" in interpreting FLSA 
S 207(e)(4). 
 
As to the persuasiveness of agency interpretive 
guidelines, we note our continued reliance on the 
framework laid out in Skidmore v. Swift , 323 U.S. 134 
(1944). See, e.g., Cleary, 167 F .3d at 809. The 
Skidmore Court explained: 
 
       [R]ulings, interpretations and opinions of the 
       Administrator under this Act, while not contr olling 
       upon the courts by reason of their authority, do 
       constitute a body of experience and informed judgment 
       to which courts and litigants may properly r esort for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. As the Supreme Court noted, defer ence to agency interpretation is 
appropriate for an agency's interpretation of its own regulation where the 
regulation itself is ambiguous. Christensen , 529 U.S. 576, 120 S.Ct. at 
1663. That is not the case here. 
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       guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a 
       particular case will depend upon the thoroughness 
       evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
 774<!>reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
 
       pronouncements, and all those factors which give it 
       power to persuade, if lacking power to contr ol. 
 
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. In applying the Skidmore test, 
the Supreme Court has noted that agency interpr etations 
issued contemporaneous with a statute are entitled to 
greater deference. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. Department of 
Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 463 n.12 (1989) (one r eason 
deference was not due an agency interpr etation was the 
passage of time between enactment of the statute and 
promulgation of the regulation in question); General Electric 
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976) (EEOC guideline 
did not "fare well" under Swift standards in part because it 
was "not a contemporaneous interpretation"). An agency 
interpretation's persuasiveness also is derived in part from 
the "thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity 
of its reasoning, [and] its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements." Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. To be 
persuasive, an agency interpretation cannot run contrary to 
Congress's intent as reflected in a statute's plain language 
and purpose. See Cleary, 167 F.3d at 808. 
 
       3. FLSA presumes remuneration is to be included 
       in the regular pay rate 
 
We make a final observation. RHD ar gues Christensen 
stands for the proposition that unless a r elevant FLSA 
provision expressly or implicitly pr ohibits the employer's 
policy, an employee cannot demonstrate a statutory 
violation. That argument stretches Christensen in 
unconvincing fashion. The Court in Christensen  was 
concerned with whether the FLSA prohibited municipal 
employers from compelling the use of compensatory time. 
See Christensen, 529 U.S. 576, 120 S.Ct. at 1658. The 
Court read the applicable provisions of the FLSA only to 
"guarantee that an employee will be able to make some use 
of compensatory time when he requests to use it." Id. at 
1662. The Court found the provision silent with respect to 
the employer's requiring employees to use compensatory 
 
                                18 
  
time. See id. ("[T]hat provision says nothing about 
restricting an employer's efforts to r equire employees to use 
compensatory time."). 
 
But here, the FLSA expressly provides the regular rate of 
pay "shall be deemed to include all remuneration for 
employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee" unless 
it falls under a specific exemption. See 29 U.S.C. S 207(e). 
Unlike in Christensen, there is a statutory presumption 
here that remuneration in any form is included in the 
regular rate calculation. The burden is on the employer to 
establish that the remuneration in question falls under an 
exemption. Unlike in Christensen, the statutory silence in 
Section 207(e)(4) relied on by RHD cuts against it rather 
than in its favor. In short, Christensen  does not compel 
summary judgment for RHD. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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